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     The United States of America has been the cradle of merger regulation. 
During the last century, the application of rules connected with merger 
assessment was evolving in connection with the then-pr valent economic 
schools (for example the University of Chicago, etc.) and in connection with 
the amount of regulation of American economy during certain periods. The 
Courts make decisions whether or not a merger leads or does not to a 
significant lessening of competition, whereas the petitioners can be persons 
affected by relevant merger, states or federal antitrus  Agencies (FTC or DOJ). 
The notifications of the merging parties are being f led with the above Federal 
Antitrust Agencies according to the Hart-Scott-Rodin  Antitrust Improvements 
Act. 
     There are two possible anticompetitive effects of mergers – unilateral 
effects and coordinated effects. Both effects comple ent each other. These 
effects can be prevented by efficiency gains of the merged entity.  
     The merger assessment in the European Union or the Czech Republic is 
relatively new in comparison with the US. In contras  to the US, the 
concentrations in the EU and the Czech Republic are cleared by the Antitrust 
Agencies (namely the European Commission or Czech Competition Office). 
The decisions of these Agencies can be appealed against to the Courts, whereas 
the Courts are limited only to review of legality of the contested decision of an 
Antitrust Agency, the Courts cannot decide the merits of the contested 
decision.  
     However, the merging firms often abandon or restructure the transaction 
after it is challenged by the Antitrust Agencies. In many cases, there are no 
Court proceedings and the last stage of merger assessment is the assessment by 
the Antitrust Agencies. 
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     An important difference between the merger regulation in the US and the 
EU relates to the definition of criteria making the notification of mergers 
necessary. The notification criteria in the US are set many times lower than the 
notification criteria in the EU, which results in many more notifications in the 
US as compared to the EU (approximately six times more). 
     Until 2004, the substantive test in European Union was very unlike the 
substantive test in the US. The concentration could be prohibited only on the 
condition that the concentration created or strengthened a dominant position as 
a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded in the 
common market. This substantive test, therefore, did not enable blocking 
concentrations, when there was no dominant position created or strengthened. 
Moreover, the EU was treating the efficiency gains defense very restrictively 
and such a defense was not generally accepted. 
     In 2004, a new merger regulation was enacted and became effective in the 
EU. In relation to the substantive test, there is no significant difference between 
the compared legislations. The substantive test that is used by the European 
Commission (and adopted in a decisive regard by the Cz ch Competition 
Office) had been inspired by the merger assessment in the US. European 
Authorities were inspired by the adoption of new merger regulation and 
guidelines of the commission on assessment of mergers by the unilateral 
effects and coordinated effects analysis detailed in the US merger horizontal 
guidelines. Moreover, the organization of the Directorate General of Antitrust 
in the EU has been changed and a special economic department dealing with 
assessment of effects of mergers was founded. 
     In 2010, the US Antitrust Agencies issued new Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines that broadened significantly the enumeration of methods and 
actions used by the US Antitrust Agencies by assessm nt of effects of mergers. 
This change is an evolutionary change; no revolutionary change has been 
made. 
     However, some minor differences in the process of assessment of effects of 
mergers persist. Those differences relate mostly to the definition of the relevant 
market; moreover, a relevant market must not be defined by the US Antitrust 
Agencies in all cases. Some minor differences might be found in the 
determination of some analytical tools and methods and their importance in 
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merger assessment. While there is an emphasis placed on the diversion ratio in 
the US, the European Union and Czech Authorities analyze mainly rates of 
substitution and elasticity.  
     Even today it can be argued that the US merger assessment is more evolved 
and sound in the US than in the European Union or the Czech Republic. In the 
US there is a broader and more specialized discussion related to the effects of 
mergers and their assessment – for example, this even l d to bald move by the 
Antitrust Agencies, in which they did not define relevant market. From the 
economical point of view is this process justifiable; however, determination of 
a relevant market might add more persuasiveness to perspective complaints of 
US Antitrust Agencies. 
     The legislation of the Czech Republic, namely stipulations of the Antitrust 
Act and implementing regulations are inspired in a significant way by the 
legislation of merger regulation in the European Union. The same conclusion 
can be made with respect to the case law of the Czech Competition Office and 
its notifications that inform merging parties about the process of assessment of 
the effects of concentrations. 
     There can be some imperfections identified in the Czech Antitrust Act. One 
of the imperfections are extreme formalistic definitions of individual legal 
terms (for example the term concentration of competitors, competitor). The 
terms are applied relatively extensively. respected commentaries and law 
scholars agree that the accuracy of such extensive application is doubtful. The 
legislation of the Czech Republic differs from the EU legislation in some 
further less important aspects that are set out in more detail in the thesis (for 
example there is no Luxembourg exemption applied in the Czech Republic and 
the change of quality of control is applied somewhat differently). 
 
